This paper provides direct experimental evidence of the effect of sunshine and good weather on individual risk taking. We show that, after controlling for other variables such as gender, religion and sex, sunshine and good weather promote risk taking. This effect is present whether relying on objective measures of meteorological conditions or subjective weather assessments. We find that bad weather increases our risk aversion estimates by an average of 40%.
Introduction
The impact of sunlight and, more generally, weather conditions on economic activity and the stock market has been documented by several studies. For example, Saunders (1993) find that NYSE index returns tends to be negative when it is cloudy in New York City. In subsequent work, Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) document that daily nominal returns on a nation's stock index is negatively associated with the level of (above average) daily cloudiness in the city where the national stock market is located. Similarly, Kamstra, Kramer, and Levi (2003) document seasonal variations in stock market returns, and relate such differences in returns to (predictable) variations in the exposure to sunlight of countries located at different latitudes in the Northern and Southern hemisphere. In related work, Kamstra, Kramer, and Levi (2000) and (2002) show that the daylight saving change weekend is associated with an abnormal negative return. Lo and Wu (2010) find that analysts are more pessimistic in the fall, a period of the year characterized by greater than average downward revisions of earnings forecasts.
The impact of sunlight and weather in general on human mood has been widely examined in the clinical psychology literature. For example, good mood has been associated with low levels of humidity (Sanders and Brizzolara, 1982) , high levels of sunlight (Cunnigham, 1979 , Parrot and Sabini, 1990 , and Schwartz and Clore, 1983 , high barometric pressure (Goldstein, 1972) , and high temperature (Cunnigham, 1979, Howarth and Hoffman, 1984) . Furthermore, the effect of temperature and sunlight is especially strong in the spring, when people have been deprived of such weather (Keller et al., 2005) .
While it can be expected that mood has an effect on human behavior, less clear is the process by which mood exerts such influence. A possible explanation is that mood affects cognitive behavior and, thus decision making (see Isen, 2000) . In this framework, investors in a good mood would be characterized by a positive and upbeat bias or, perhaps, be just more open to external inducements to hold stocks in their portfolios. This has been identified in the literature as "cognitive-evaluation" channel.
A second explanation of the effect of mood on decision making is that mood affects risk preferences and, thus, the level of individual risk aversion. For example, research in experimental psychology has documented a negative link between anxiety (and depression) and "sensation seeking" measures. Sensation seeking measures have been extensively documented to be reliable proxy for risk-taking behavior in experimental studies. More recently, Eisenberg et al. (1998) show in experimental studies that depressed individuals tend also to be more risk averse in a series of hypothetical everyday-life situations.
1 In this framework, people in a good mood would be more risk tolerant and thus more willing to hold stocks in their portfolio, and for lower expected returns. This has been identified in the literature as "risk-tolerance" channel.
The precise mechanism by which sunlight affects stock prices, whether it happens through the "cognitive-evaluation" or the "risk-tolerance" channel, is still an open question. Identification of the channel at work is important because of its different implications for security prices valuations. Specifically, the "cognitive-evaluation" channel implies that individual investors are affected by cognitive biases that may lead them to a biased assessment of the valuation of a security and therefore to make the wrong investment decisions. For example, Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) suggest that "investors can benefit from becoming aware of their moods in order to avoid mood-based errors in their judgment and trades." In alternative, the "risk-tolerance" channel would have the more limited (and probably less troublesome) implication that investors preferences change over time and they are affected by environmental variables such as sunshine.
While field studies are valuable tools to assess the economic significance of certain effects, it is usually difficult if not impossible to isolate the impact of a single effect with field data. Laboratory experiments, on the contrary, allow us to measure individual risk attitudes as a function of single or interactive factors in a laboratory environment, where other confounding variables are kept controlled. Charness (2010) provides a review of how experimental analysis can disentangle the effect of psychological biases on individual risk attitudes and financial markets.
In this paper, we provide experimental evidence in favor of the risk-tolerance channel by studying the impact of sunlight on risk preferences. We argue that sunlight may affect security prices by affecting individual risk-tolerance and, thus, the stochastic discount factor of an economy. Specifically, we find that after controlling for other factors, such as religion and race, sunlight and good weather have a positive impact on risk-taking behavior: individuals are more risk tolerant in sunny days. This result holds for both objective and subjective measures of weather conditions. Finally, we assess the impact of weather on risk aversion by estimating the coefficient of risk aversion using our experimental data. We find that, depending on the weather measure used, bad weather increases our risk aversion estimates between 25% and 70%.
We adopt the multiple price-list method of Holt and Laury (2002) , which has become the standard approach in experimental economics to measure individuals' risk attitudes. The advantages of the Holt and Laury (2002) approach, which made it so popular among experimentalists, are its transparency to subjects (the methodology is easy to explain and implement), the minimum effort required to the experimental subjects (who just need to choose between two alternative options), and its suitability to elicit attitudes through incentives tasks.
We conduct a series of experiments in which subjects are presented with sets of lottery pairs. Subjects are required to choose one lottery out of each pair in all set of lotteries. Payoffs are then determined, given the subjects' choices and the outcome of the randomization. At the end of the experiment, we ask the subjects to complete a questionnaire, which include background information, as well as their subjective assessment of the weather conditions.
Our paper sheds light on the economic importance of the "risk-tolerance" channel discussed above. Since in our experiments the actual probabilities and payoffs of lotteries are fully transparent to subjects, our paper limits (although, it may not completely eliminate) the impact of cognitive biases on individual decision making in risky situations. In this way, the results of our study suggest that weather and sunlight affect individual choices by affecting the level of risk aversion, rather than through the impact on cognitive biases such as the perception of the objective probabilities involved in risky situations. This means that security prices, and returns, are more likely to be affected by "fundamentals" such as individual risk aversion and rather than by inefficient information processing by investors.
Our paper is related to several strands of literature. The first one is the now large emerging literature documenting the impact of alternative measures of weather conditions on financial market performance. In addition to the works mentioned above, Goetzmann and Zhu (2005) find that NYSE bid-ask spreads widen on cloudy days, although weather does not seem to have a direct impact on trading volumes. Loughran and Schulz (2004) find that cloudy conditions near a firm's headquarters do not affect stock returns. Limpaphayom, Locke, and Sarajoti (2007) provide evidence of an increase of the effective bid-ask spread of S&P500 index futures on windy days in Chicago. Kaplanski and Levy (2008) find that perceived market risk, as measured by the VIX index (the so-called "fear index"), is greater in the fall and in days with relatively small number of daylight hours. Shon and Zhou (2006) find relatively more positive market reactions to earning surprises on sunny days in New York City. Finally, Keef and Roush (2007) in a meta-analysis on 26 stock exchanges find that the influence of cloud cover on stock returns becomes more negative as the latitude of the location of a nations's stock exchange increases (and, interestingly, also as the per capita GDP increases). While these papers suggest an impact of weather conditions on financial markets performance, they give little clue on the precise mechanism underlying such influence.
A second stream of research is the large literature aimed at measuring risk aversion and, more specifically, at identifying factors that affect individual risk aversion. In the first group, we refer to Cox and Harrison (2008) for a comprehensive collection of works aimed at eliciting and measuring risk aversion in laboratory experiments.
More closely related to our work is the research studying the impact of mood and mood shown that risk aversion tends to be lower in men than women (Dohmen et al., 2010 , Charness and Gneezy, 2011 , and see also Eckel and Grossman, 2007 , for a comprehensive survey), 2 and for younger (Dohmen et al., 2010) and wealthier (Guiso and Paiella, 2008) individuals. Finally, risk aversion has also been documented to be lower for children with more educated parents (Dohmen et al., 2010, and Hryshko, Luengo-Prado and Sorensen, 2011) , and to be related to happiness (see Lepori, 2010, among others).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we outline our research question and the experiment design. In Section 3 we describe our experimental procedures and we provide the main results of our analysis. In Section 4 we present a few extensions.
Section 5 concludes.
Experimental design and demographics
Experimental design. Our analysis investigates whether subjects' decisions in a risky environment are affected by climatic conditions. To examine whether risk preferences are associated with objective and/or perceived weather states, we ran a controlled experiment where subjects were exposed to different weather conditions (treatments). To operationalize the weather treatments and control the assignment of subjects we scheduled twin pairs of experimental sessions per week in days with good and bad weather forecasts (where details of the definitions of good and bad weather conditions are provided below). Subjects could register for participating in the experiment only by registering to both the twin sessions. Subjects were told that they would been ultimately selected for participating in one of the twin sessions, but that they could not choose which session they could attend (although they could give a preference). Subjects were randomly allocated by the experimenter to one of the two sessions (regardless of the subjects' preference). To minimize any possible cross session influences on the outcomes of the experiments, the participants were allowed to participate only once in the experimental study.
The experiment was conducted by paper and pencil in a large classroom with a target number of participants equal to 15 and an average of the actual number of subjects equal to 12.
3 Upon arrival, subjects were seated at workplaces placed throughout the classroom in a way that each subject could not see what others subjects were doing, and could not be seen by others.
We recruited 140 subjects from March 2011 to February 2012 over 12 sessions in total.
The lottery choice experiment had a 2 x 2 x 3 design, with two weather treatments (good and bad), 2 payoffs treatments (low and high), and 3 different lottery choice tasks (risk aversion, skewness, and a combination of risk and skewness). We observed a total of 8400 decisions. The experiment was conducted in a large classroom of the Kenan-Flagler Business School which allowed for exposure to the outside weather conditions.
We used a between-subjects design for the weather treatments: subjects were randomly allocated to participate in only one of the weather treatments. We had a total of 55 subjects (40% of total) in the good weather, and 85 (60% of total) in the bad weather treatment. Furthermore, we used a within-subject design for the payoff and task treatments:
every subject participated in all the payoff and task treatments sequentially. The first three rounds were the lottery-choice tasks with low payoffs, where subjects were asked to complete three tasks: the risk aversion, the skewness and, last, the combination of risk-skewness task. In the last three rounds, subjects were asked to complete the same tasks and in the same order as in the first three rounds, but with lottery payoffs being 10 times the lottery payoffs of the first three rounds.
Experimental procedures. Each experimental session consisted of six rounds of tasks performed by subjects who enrolled in the UNC e-recruit subject pool. Subjects joined the subject pool voluntarily by completing a form on line indicating their interest in participating in experiments. When a student enrolled for participation in the experiment, she was told only that she would participate in an experiment about decision making under uncertainty and that "You will be offered at least $10 for your participation. You may be able to make up to $30 (or even more) by participating.
On average, participants will earn around $20, though you may earn less. The total amount of time you will spend in the study will be less than one hour."
Every subject was asked to participate to a six-round long experiment. At the end of the sixth rounds, they were asked to participate in a questionnaire about their socioeconomic characteristics including: i) general information of the subject; ii) individual and family income and education; iii) health; iv) religion; v) political and economic views.
When a subject entered the laboratory, she was given a card with a unique subject number, which identified the subject during the experiment, and they were given a consent form. After signing the consent form, subjects were given six tables. Each table consisted of 10 different pair of lotteries with monetary payoffs attached to every lottery. The subject needed to choose a lottery out of each pair, thus making a total of 60 decisions. Along with the tables, the subjects were given written instructions that were read aloud to induce common knowledge that every subject was participating in the same experiment. The instructions included specific examples to clarify the use of the tables. The instructions given to the subjects are displayed in the Appendix.
After reading the instructions, subjects were given an opportunity to ask questions.
There was no time limit for the experiment and subjects had the opportunity to ask additional questions during the experiment in private. A monitor was present to answer questions and to ensure that subjects did not communicate with each other.
After all subjects made their decisions, experimental personnel went to each subject to randomly determine their payoffs. After the determination of the payoffs from the experiment, the subjects were given the questionnaire. As soon as everybody had answered the questionnaire, subjects were paid privately and could leave the room where the experiment was taking place.
Demographics. Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix report the demographics of the population on which the experiment was conducted. The population of the experiment presents low dispersion in age, racial group, marital status, area of birth, candidate voted in the last Presidential election, and religious faith. However, the sample appears to be more evenly distributed when it comes to income, political leaning, religiousness, gender, and the extent to which the current status of the economy is a concern. Interestingly, this is also the same set of variables that other studies have already found to have a potential impact on individuals' risk attitudes (see for example Benjamin et al., 2010 , Dohmen et al., 2011 , Eckel and Grossman, 2007 , Guiso and Paiella, 2008 , Hibbert et al., 2008 , Hillary and Hui, 2011 , Renneboog and Spaenjers, 2011 , and Shu et al., 2010 . In this way, our experiment is an ideal laboratory to test the hypothesis of the effect of weather on risk aversion, after controlling for other personal characteristics that we know affect risk aversion.
Risk Aversion
Risk Preference Elicitation. We employed the standard experimental protocol to capture risk preference -the lottery choice task from Holt and Laury (2002) . In the Holt and Laury (2002) design, subjects are presented with a sequence of choices between two lotteries, which we call "Option A" or "Option B". Table 1 illustrates the matrix presented to subjects in our experiments. Subjects are asked to make 10 choices between 10 pairs of lotteries. The amounts at stake are identical across the 10 decisions, but the probabilities with which they may occur differ. For example, the first row shows that lottery A offered a 10% chance of receiving $2 and a 90% chance of receiving $1.60. Similarly, lottery B in the first row has a 10% chance of receiving a payoff of $3.85 and a 90% chance of receiving a payoff of $0.10.
Payoffs were decided by a fair throw of 2 ten-sided dices (one with sides going from Notes -This is the table that the experimental subjects were offered in the risk aversion treatment.
0 to 9 and one from 00 to 90). For Decision 1, the first payoff is paid if the throw of the two ten-sided dice sums to 10 or less and the second payoff is paid for any other throw of the dice. Similarly, for decision 2, the first payoff is paid if the sum of the two ten-sided dice is 20 or less and the second payoff is paid if the sum of the two dices was more than 20. As one proceeds down the matrix, the payoffs remain the same, but the probabilities change (the chance of receiving the first payoff increases in both lotteries). By Decision 9 there is a 90% chance of winning the higher prize, and Decision 10 is a choice between a certain amount in Option A and a certain amount in Option B.
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In this experiment design,in the first 9 rows Option A represents the "safer" lottery and Option B the "riskier" as the lottery in Option A displays always in a lower variance than Option B, but the expected value of lottery B becomes greater relative to the expected value of lottery A. The expected value, variance and higher order moments for both lotteries are shown in Table 2 .
The matrix of ten decisions is designed in a way that only extremely risk-seeking 5 An additional six-sided die was thrown to determine which one of the six treatments had been selected to determine the payoffs. subjects choose lottery B in the first row, and only extremely risk-averse subjects choose lottery A in the ninth row. A risk neutral subject would choose A as long as the expected value of Option A is higher than the expected value of Option B (which is the case in the first four rows), and B otherwise (which is the case in the last 6 rows). Notice that the tenth decision does not involve any risk as each option yield a sure amount, thus is considered as a control that the subject has understood the instructions and he/she is paying attention to the task, but it does not have any relevance for risk aversion at all.
Each subject was also exposed to an additional risk aversion task (round 4), with prizes 10 times the ones described by the above table. In this way, we can estimate the degree of risk aversion for greater lottery's magnitudes. Following this main treatment, we conducted additional treatments aimed at checking the robustness of our findings concerning the effect of weather on risk aversion. We discuss them in greater details in section 4.
Definitions of Good and Bad Weather.
There is no universally accepted definition of good and bad weather. This prompted us to use three main definitions of weather Since the subjective component plays a key role in assessing the perceived quality of weather, we used the answers to the question "How do you feel about the Weather?" provided in the questionnaire, as one of our subjective measures of good/bad weather.
Specifically, subjects were asked to answer this question on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 is "Terrible" and 7 is "Awesome". In this way, we attempted to capture individual differences in the perception of weather conditions. We pooled subjects roughly into three terciles and focused on the differences between the two extreme ones: the bottom third, which included subjects that provided an assessment of weather between 1 and 3, and the top third which included subjects that provided a weather assessment of 6 or 7. We denoted this measure as the subjective weather assessment.
Finally, precipitation provides another indicator of the quality of weather in any given day. Accordingly, we define a rainy day as one in which the amount of rainfall exceeds the daily average amount in the area in which the experiment was conducted (which is 0.12 inches per day). According to this measure a rainy day is a bad weather day. We called this assessment of the weather condition as the objective precipitation measure. Table 3 Statistical Analysis. Are the differences in risk aversion documented in figure 1 statistically significant? In this section we perform an econometric analysis to assess the validity of our hypothesis, after controlling for other personal characteristics that may have an impact on risk taking behavior. We use a logit regression to estimate the effect of each our weather measures on the probability of selecting the safer choice A. Specifically, throughout our empirical analysis we set:
1 + e β x·lottery = Λ (β x · lottery) , where A is the safer choice and x is a vector of explanatory variables, which always includes a constant. Interacting the regressors with the lottery number is a parsimonious way of including fixed effects for the lottery number.
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Explanatory variables. The explanatory variables we use are reported in the first column of Table 4 . We distinguish between two groups of explanatory variables:
weather related regressors and other personal characteristics. The weather related variables are: precipitation (a dummy that equals one if the amount of precipitation exceeds the average daily amount, and is equal to minus one otherwise), overcastclear (a dummy that equals one if the number of minutes of overcast weather and precipitation exceeds the number of minutes of clear sky, and is equal to -1 otherwise), and subjective weather (a dummy that equals 1, when the subjective assessment of weather is bad, and is equal to -1, when the subjective assessment of weather is good according to the definition reported in the previous section).
The personal characteristics variables are: income (expressed in US dollars), religious (a dummy which equals one if the subject answered "yes" to the question "Are you religious?"), political leaning (a dummy which equals 1 if the subject self declared as liberal or most liberal, and -1 if the subject self declared as conservative or most conservative), gender (a dummy which equals 1 for male and -1 for female), race, play lotteries (a dummy which equals 1 if the subject plays lotteries at least once a year), and economy concerned (a dummy that equals 1, if the subject responded "yes" to Notes -All regressions include an intercept and a lottery number indicator. These parameters are not reported in table in the interest of space. They are always statistically significant. One star, two stars, and three stars refer to statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
the question "Are you concerned about the economy?"). For all these variables the experimental distributions are reported in tables A.1 and A.2.
Statistical significance. In order to maximize statistical power, in our analysis only the choices for lotteries 4-7 were used in the regressions. 8 Table 4 shows the results of our econometric analysis. The first column reports the estimated coefficients for the specifications in which only one explanatory variable at a time appears in the logit regressions. All the weather related variables appear to be strongly statistically significant at 1% confidence levels. Among the other personal characteristics, 8 The reason for limiting ourselves to decisions 4-7 is that, by examinations of Table 2 , for choices 1-3, Option A looks so favorable compared to Option B in terms of expected payoff and variance, that even the most risk loving individual would find it hard to turn it down. Similarly, for decisions 8-10, Option B looks very appealing even to be most risk averse individual. religiousness appears to be the only statistically significant variable. Specifically, the negative regression coefficients suggests that more religious people display a stronger risk taking behavior. This finding is broadly consistent with the work of Benjamin, Choi, and Fisher (2010) .
The statistical significance of the weather related variables is robust after controlling for income, religiousness, and political leaning, as documented in regressions 2 through 7. In these regressions, we choose to include only one weather related variable at a time, given the non-negligible degree of correlation among this set of variables, as reported in Table 3 . The signs of the regression coefficients of the weather related variables confirm our hypothesis that bad weather promotes risk aversion.
Economic significance. Figure 2 reports the estimated probabilities of choosing the safer option for our three main weather variables. The three panels also include the 95% confidence intervals. Estimated coefficients and the corresponding standard errors are relative to regression 1 in table 3. Figure 2 highlights that bad weather may result in up to a twice as large probability of choosing the safer option. This is particularly apparent from looking at lotteries 5 and 6, which are the ones for which a non risk-neutral decision maker would start considering switching from the safer to the riskier option.
Risk Aversion and High Payoffs. Holt and Laury (2002) document that risk aver-
sion is increasing in the Dollar amounts at stakes in the lotteries. In order to control the robustness of our analysis to this effect, we repeated the experiment by multiplying all amounts by 10. Figure 3 reports the experimental frequencies for this high payoffs treatment. Just as in the case with low payoffs, bad weather reduces risk taking among the subjects. Table 5 reports the results of the statistical analysis, where in the logit regression we follows the same procedure as in the low-payoffs case. Note however that, since risk aversion is on average higher for higher payoffs (as documented in Holt and Laury, 2002), we now focus on decisions 5 through 9. This allows Economy concerned −0.026
Notes -All regressions include an intercept and a lottery number indicator. These parameters are not reported in table in the interest of space. They are always statistically significant. One star, two stars, and three stars refer to statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
us to better capture individuals' behavior for the most sensitive lotteries. The results are consistent with the ones reported in the previous section: bad weather results in a more pronounced degree of risk aversion. Finally, Figure 4 reports the estimated probabilities of choosing the safer option for our three main weather variables in the case of high payoffs and the 95% confidence intervals. Just as in the case of low payoff, bad weather induces greater risk aversion when any of our three measures of bad weather is used.
Relative Risk Aversion Estimates
The results reported in the previous sections raise the question of the assessing the quantitative impact of the weather conditions on the subjects' risk aversion. Using the proportion of safe choices in the high and low risk aversion treatments (pooled and separately for low and high payoffs), we can estimate the preference parameters of the "power-expo" utility function proposed by Saha (1993) :
This specification nests the cases of constant relative risk aversion (α → 0) and constant absolute risk aversion (r → 0). In this approach, for given choices of α and r a subject chooses option A with either probability 0 or 1. To better fit the smooth probability profiles reported in figures 1-4, we follow Luce (1959) , and Holt and Laury (2002), by introducing a noise parameter, µ, that captures the insensitivity of choice probabilities to payoffs via the probabilistic choice rule:
where U A (resp. U B ) represents the utility derived from selecting lottery A (resp. B). Table 6 reports the preference and the noise parameters estimated via maximum like- The bottom part of the same table focuses on the Relative Risk Aversion (RRA) computed at these estimated coefficients. Arrow-Pratt RRA for "power-expo" utility functions can be readily computed as: Notes -The top part of the table reports the estimated coefficients for the power-expo utility function, U (x) = 1 − exp{−αx 1−r } /α, and the noise parameter µ. The numbers in square brackets are standard errors. Estimates were obtained via MLE, using the proportion of safe choices in each of the ten decisions in the low and high payoffs' treatments. The bottom portion of the table reports the Relative Risk Aversions (RRA) computed at the estimated coefficients. For the case of "Low payoffs", the RRA was computed about the average amount at stake in the low payoff treatment, using the choices of a risk-neutral agent. For the case of "High payoffs", the RRA was computed about the average amount at stake in the high payoff treatment, using the choices of a risk-neutral agent. The percentage numbers represent the percentage increase in risk aversion within each weather category for each level of payoffs. The percentage number with the † represents the percentage increase in risk aversion between low and high payoffs.
where x is the amount about which the RRA is being calculated. For the low payoffs treatment, we set x = $2.43 and for the high payoffs treatment, we set x = $24.28.
These values correspond to the average amounts at stake in the two treatments.
As a point of comparison, consider first the percentage increase in risk aversion between the low and high payoff treatments. In this case, from Table 6 , the coefficient of RRA increases from 0.532, in the case of low payoffs, to 1.051, in the case of high payoffs, which represents an increase of almost 100%. Following a similar approach, the effect of bad weather on risk aversion can be assessed by noting that bad weather determines a percentage increase of the coefficient of RRA that range from 25% (in the case of the subjective measures of weather) to 70% (in the case of low payoffs and the precipitation measure), with an average increase around 40%. We consider this as being a significant effect when compared with the observed increase due to a change of the amount at stake.
Further results
During our experimental sessions, we also conducted several robustness checks of our hypothesis of the effect of weather on risk taking behavior. Specifically, the subjects were asked to choose between a number of additional paired lotteries that were which the subjects were asked to choose among lotteries with low payoffs and varying levels of skewness (denoted as the low-payoff skewness treatment). Additionally, subjects were also faced with an additional treatment in which all payoffs displayed in Table 7 were multiplied by 10 (high payoffs skewness treatment).
The bottom panel of the Table 7 documents that "Option A" and "Option B" were identical in terms of even moments, but differed for expected values and skewness.
Equivalently, we use this treatment to assess the amount of average return that the subjects are willing to give up in order to achieve a reduction in the negative skewness of the lottery. The choices at decisions 7,8, and 9 are the most interesting ones, given that expected values are almost identical and one option is positively skewed, while the other is negatively skewed.
We perform then the same logit regression as in the other treatments, and we report the results in table 8. This table documents that bad weather increases the likelihood of the subjects choosing "Option A", despite this option being the one with the lower expected value. This result holds for both low and high payoffs. We interpret these results as suggesting that weather increases individuals' aversion to negatively skewed gambles. The effect, however, is not always large enough to claim statistical significance. This is possibly due to the subjects' difficulties in analytically assessing the differences between the two options.
Risk and Skew Aversion. We have also performed a series of treatments in which the riskier lottery is also positively skewed, for each paired assignment. Consistently with our earlier findings, we did not find any statistically significant difference related to the weather condition. We conjecture that this finding is due to the offsetting effects of weather on risk-and skewness-aversion. These results are available upon request to the authors.
Concluding Remarks
We provided experimental evidence of the effect of weather on risk aversion. After measuring bad and good weather conditions with a large set of variables, we concluded that bad weather increases risk aversion, while good weather conditions promote risk taking behavior. The result appears to be robust to the inclusion of various control variables. Furthermore, we show that the effect of weather spreads to other aspects of risk-taking behavior, such as aversion to negatively skewed gambles.
Appendix
Instructions. You will be distributed 7 sheets. The first six sheets are numbered from 1 to 6. The last sheet is not numbered and it will be used to report your earnings. Each numbered sheet shows ten Decisions, which are numbered on the left. Each decision is a paired choice between "Option A" and "Option B". You will make sixty choices and record your choice in the column at the far right. Only one decision will be used to determine your earnings. Before you start making your sixty choices, please let me explain how these choices will affect your earnings for this part of the experiment.
There are four dice that will be used to determine payoffs:
• The first die has six faces numbered from 1 to 6.
• The second die has ten faces numbered from 0 to 9.
• The third die has ten faces numbered from 00 to 90 in increments of 10 (i.e., 00, 10, 20,... 90).
• The fourth die has 10 faces numbered from 0 to 9.
At the end of the experiment, after you have made all your choices, we will come to each of you and roll each die once. We will roll the first die to select one the six sheets. We will then roll the second die to select one of the ten decisions. We will interpret the number 0 as 10. We will use this decision to determine your earnings, as follows.
We will roll the third and fourth dice together and we will sum of the numbers of the two dice; we will interpret the number 0 as 100. Now, please look at Decision 1 in the Example on the following page. Option A will pay $10 if the sum of the numbers on the third and fourth dice is 10 or less, and it will pay $30 if the sum of the numbers is 11 or more. Option B will pay $22 if the sum of the numbers on the dice is 10 or less, and it will pay $2 if the sum of the numbers on the dice is 11 or more. The other Decisions are treated in a similar way.
In this example, the first die has returned 5, which determines the sheet number at the top right of the page; the second die has returned 8, which determines Decision 8; the third and forth dice have returned 80 and 5 respectively, with a total of 85. Since this number is greater than 80, you will be paid $30 if you selected Option A, or you will be paid $2.00 if you selected Option B.
To summarize, you will make sixty choices: for each decision row you will have to choose between Option A and Option B. You may choose A for some decisions and B for other decisions; you may change your decisions and make them in any order. When you are finished, we will roll the first die to select which of the six sheets will be used. Then we will roll the second die to select which of the ten Decisions will be used. Then we will roll the third and fourth dice to determine your money earnings for the selected Decision. Earnings for this choice will be paid in cash when we finish. Even though you will make sixty decisions, only one of these will end up affecting your earnings, but you will not know in advance which decision will be used. Obviously, each decision has an equal chance of being used.
Are there any questions? Now you may begin making your choices. Please does not talk with anyone while we are doing this; raise your hand if you have a question.
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Example:
The first die returns the number 5.
The second die returns the number 8.
The third die returns the number 80. The fourth die returns the number 5. The total is 85 (80+5). Since this number is larger than 80, you will be paid $30.00, if you selected option A, or you will be paid $2.00, if you selected option B.
Note: in this example, if the total is 80 or less, you will be paid $10.00 if you selected "Option A" or $22.00 if you selected "Option B". 
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